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Advocacy and the Public Advocate 
by Ralph E. Townsend  
As Richard Silkman and Charles Colgan make clear in their comments in this issue, Maine’s 
telecommunications policy has been surprisingly clear and consistent in the post-AT&T 
divestiture period. And Governor McKernan chose a specialist in telecommunications policy, 
Kenneth Gordon, as his first appointment to the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) chair. Yet 
telecommunications policy in Maine has gone nowhere in the past five years. Why has this 
happened? And why during this same period did a state like Vermont, which is very similar to 
Maine in many important ways, strike out on a fundamental revision of its telecommunications 
regulatory structure?  
Let me suggest that it is not coincidental that Vermont has a different regulatory structure and 
that Vermont has a more progressive telecommunications policy. In Vermont, the public utilities 
advocacy role (e.g., the role of opposing rate increase requests) is within the Department of 
Public Service, an executive agency. In Maine, the advocacy role is within the PUC itself. 
Fundamental changes in regulatory policy, such as shifts to some form of incentive regulation for 
telecommunications, have broad policy implications that should involve broad political 
constituencies. When the advocacy role is held by the executive branch, the Governor and her 
administration become intimately involved in the policy and politics that surround such 
important questions. 
In Maine, on the other hand, the advocacy staff reports to no politically accountable person. 
Maine’s telecommunications advocacy staff are personally very skeptical about the need to move 
from traditional rate-of-return regulation, and that their skepticism has been an obstacle to 
telecommunications reform. Faced with staff whose views are different from those of the PUC 
commissioners, the regulated utilities have increasingly decided to litigate issues before the 
commission. But the adversarial context of the regulatory hearing room may not be the right 
framework in which to devise new regulatory incentives and new regulatory protections. In 
virtually every state that has adopted alternative regulatory approaches for telecommunications, 
that alternative was the result of either negotiated settlements or specific legislative mandate. 
Regulatory hearings are structured around who wins and loses on particular points. Negotiated 
settlements tend to focus on assignment of risks and responsibilities in the new and unpredictable 
environment. 
Moving the advocacy staff from the PUC to the Public Advocate’s office would be an easy and 
obvious transition. The Public Advocate’s office already exists with a mandate for advocacy. 
The advocacy staff and the Public Advocate’s office have taken very similar positions on 
virtually all regulatory matters, so the move will not involve insurmountable immediate policy 
differences. As the prominence of the Public Advocate’s role increases, we can expect the 
Governor to take a more active interest in that office. 
Moving the advocacy staff from the PUC to the Public Advocate’s office will also resolve a 
built-in conflict of interest within the PUC. At present, the staff of the PUC acts as both 
advocacy staff and hearing examiner staff. While the PUC has tried to adopt procedures to 
minimize this conflict, conflicts are inherent in this structure. For example, Lawyer Smith may 
be the hearing examiner on a telecommunications case in which Lawyer Jones serves as 
advocate. In a subsequent electric case, Lawyer Jones may be the hearing examiner while 
Lawyer Smith is the advocate. Such reversal of roles would be unacceptable in any judicial 
process. (Or imagine letting Central Maine Power advocacy lawyers act as hearing examiners for 
telecommunications cases!) And the confusion of roles also exists for other PUC staff. Hearing 
examiner staff routinely prepare independent analyses that are not based specifically upon the 
hearing record and are not subject to rebuttal. 
The new commission chair, Thomas Welch, may well provide the leadership that will put 
telecommunications policy back on the agenda. But effective, long-run policy institutions cannot 
be built around personalities. When structures are clearly a contributing factor to policy inaction, 
we need to review and revise those institutions to serve the public interest. 
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